Waste products have double properties of environmental hazard and resource recovery, while recycling behavior has greater positive external effect of economic, which often results in the low enthusiasm for enterprises to engage in remanufactured activity. For price decisions on whether government subsidizes closed-loop supply chain or not, Stackelberg game model were constructed under three scenarios: none is subsidized (Model N), subsidize to manufacturer (Model M) and subsidized to recycler (Model R) to
Introduction
In recent years, the environmental pollution and lack of resources are constantly highlighted all over the world, which makes the new energy vehicles are increasingly concerned and promoted by society. It is conducive to further improve energy efficiency, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and promote energy conservation and emission reduction (Xu et al., 2018a) [1] . However, according to "energy saving and new energy automotive industry development (2012-2020)" issued by China, the cumulative production and sales of pure electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid vehicles are to over 5 million by 2020. Relevant data forecast the cumulative discard amount of Chinese pure electric passenger cars and hybrid passenger power battery will reach 120,000-170,000 tons by around 2020. Thus, the recycling and reuse of new energy vehicle power battery have become a problem which cannot be ignored. Usually, the life of lithium battery is about 20 years, but for new energy vehicles can only be 3-5 years before scrapped. Because the capacity decays to the initial capacity of 80% or less, the electric car mileage will be significantly reduced, and the battery must be replaced. From the current situation in Europe and United States, some manufacturers are vigorously promoting the use of battery recycling research to develop technology for large-scale commercial recycling (Xu and Wang, 2018b [2] ; Nazari et al., 2018 [3] ).
For example, the Umicore developed ultra-high temperature technology to recycle the waste batteries. A US company, in the opposite direction of the former, uses liquid nitrogen in ultra-low temperature environment for batteries for processing so that chemical properties become inactive.
And Germany whose has no battery manufacturers, is also working to study the recycling network system. It is known that the current power battery research in China is mainly focused on improving safety performance and service life, and for the recycling is very scarce, or even seriously out of touch. As power batteries, the lithium battery contains mercury, cadmium, lead and other large amounts of toxic heavy metal elements. Its positive and negative materials, electrolyte solutions and other substances also have considerable impacts on the environment.
Indeed, the waste's number of tens of thousands of tons per year about future treatment is a great problem. With the overall rise in the demand for electric vehicles, lithium will be in short supply in the future. Thus, recycling and remanufacturing, as an effective way to achieve the recycling of resources, are cost-savings and sales-revenue-satisfying, which also is conducive to establish a recycling economy to achieve economically and environmentally sustainable development.
At the present stage of recycling and remanufacturing, the recycling method of used products mainly includes value-added method (such as remanufacturing, refurbishment and repairing) and material recycling method (such as dismantling and recycling). In the treatment of waste lithium batteries, it is necessary to be pretreated, including discharge, dismantling and iron shell after dismantling. Then treat the electrode material such as alkali leaching, acid leaching, and extract after various procedures. However, complex recycling procedures and technology development make a lot of recycling companies are discouraged. Government subsidies, as a powerful tool to stimulate the domestic demand and promote circular economy, play an increasingly important role in decision-making of CLSC. In Europe and United States developed countries, remanufacturing research experiment has been given permanent tax credit and detailed subsidy support policy has been developed. Compared with developed countries, China has promulgated the relevant subsidy policy for the waste electrical and electronic products. Taking automotive engines, gearbox and other remanufactured products as the pilot financial subsidies. However, in the actual implementation process, due to different designs of subsidy model and subsidy objects of government, the impact of closed-loop supply chain operation efficiency difference is very significant. How much the subsidy should be given, who should obtain the subsidy, and how the government implement the subsidy to optimize the operation of the closed-loop supply chain have to be settled urgently.
Although many researchers have focused on the government subsidy (Heydari et al., 2017 [4] ; Wang et al., 2014 [5] ; Cucchiella et al., 2016 [6] ), there is limited analysis that focuses on the closed-loop supply chain, especially considers consumer segment and heterogeneous demand. To fill this gap, this paper aims to investigate the optimal decisions for government and closed-loop supply chain. The main contributions of this research are summarized as follows:
 Constructing the Stackelberg game models consisting of government, manufacturer and recycler, concerning consumer segment and heterogeneous demand.
 Deriving the optimal decisions and analyzing the impacts of relevant parameters on the demand in the benchmark model.  Proposing and comparing three kinds of subsidy models carried out by the government, and exploring the maximization of social welfare.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. After reviewing relevant literature in Section 2, we introduce the model description and assumption in Section 3. Section 4 solves the benchmark model to obtain optimal decisions without government subsidy. Section 5 presents the equilibrium and compares the difference of optimal results among three models. Additional numerical analysis is shown in Section 6, which is given by the conclusion in Section 7.
Literature review
In recent years, many scholars have researched close-loop supply chain with heterogeneous demands and government subsidy policy. This section will summarize the existing studies from three points.
Consumer preference
Recently, the consumer's preference plays an significant role in supply chain management (Cui et al., 2017[7] ). Chen et al. (2017) [8] demonstrated the price and quality decisions in dual-channel supply chain to show the effects of new channel introduction on the performance. [10] introduced members' emission reduction and consumers' preference into supply chain decision, as well as compared the optimal results between single and joint emission reduction. [11] extended the green supply chain with the channel substitution and green preference, as well as designed the two-tariff contract to coordinate the optimal decision. He et al.
(2016) [12] studied the pricing and emission reduction decision in a closed loop supply chain with price-and emission-dependent demand, and evaluate the impact of consumer behavior on closed loop supply chain. [13] analyzed the optimal sustainability degree and profit based on product sustainability and consumer preference. Differentiation of consumer's preference on the new and remeanufactured products is significant. Ferguson et al., (2006) [14] introduced the collection function to analyze the diverse price strategies of the new manufactured product and remanufactured product with the heterogeneous consumer group. Debo et al., (2006) [19] used game theory to determine ordering and pricing policies in a single-period closed loop supply chain, as well as designed a return policy to coordinate the members. This research is different from the above-mentioned literature in the two aspects, we seek to discover optimal decision of carbon emission reduction and develop the two-period decision model in a closed-loop supply chain, which is absent in the existing papers. Moreover, we identify that the difference between new and remanufactured products based on the consumer's preference. 5 The next issues is closed-loop supply chain focuing on the recycling and remanufacturing. Savaskan et al., (2004) [20] found that the joint recycling model has maximum social profits and the model of retailer recycling is superior to the others models about two-echelon supply chain. Ferrer et al., (2006) [14] compared the manufacturer's decision under the different models and investigated the reason why the manufacturer would decrease the price is to increase the market sales and the remanufactured products. Mitra et al., (2008) [21] focused on the competition between the manufacturer and retailer in a two-period game and analyzed the impact of different models on the member's responsibility and decision. Xiong et al., (2013) [22] analyzed the closed-loop supply chain consisting of one-single supplier and manufacturer, which showed that when the cost of new and remanufactured products are quite different, double marginalization will increase and operation performance of system would decrease. Although the decision models of the close-loop supply chain are developed in the above literature, consumer's preferences for remanufacturing and market segment are ignored in previous research.
Closed-loop supply chain

Government subsidy
Recycling of used products is a social systematic issue involving various factors, in which the government's role is significant (Atasu et al., 2009[23] ). Hafezalkotob (2015) [24] analyzed the optimal subsidy equilibrium of three government policies based on the competition of supply chains, as well as obtained the specific boundaries for maximizing the environmental protection and profit seeking. Shao et al., (2017) [25] analyzed the electric and gasoline vehicle markets under two different structures, as well as took social welfare into account to make government's utility maximizing. Mitra et al., (2008) [21] analyzed the two-period game model of manufacturer and remanufacturer, as well as found the government subsidy promotes remanufacturing activity with increasing member' profit. Ma [28] determined the optimal recycling fees, the selling quantity and the government subsidy in the reverse supply chain according to maximize the enterprise profit and social welfare. The study mentioned above makes great contributions to the theoretical research of closed-loop supply chain, but still has shortcomings as follows: Firstly, taking the government subsidy as the exogenous variable in the closed-loop supply chain game model to make decision, which did not conduct detail research, propounds how the government makes the subsidy policy. Secondly, most of current studies are based on the assumption that the subsidy object can be the consumer. After analyzing the influence of government on the supply chain enterprise, we can find that the subsidy object can also be the manufacturer or recycler.
Similar to Wang et al., (2014) [29] , for price decisions on whether the government subsidizes closed-loop supply chain or not, this paper established Stackelberg model under three scenarios: none is subsidized (Model N), subsidize to manufacturer (Model M) and subsidized to recycler (Model R) to obtain the optimal government subsidy and price decision, as well as analyze the difference among the equilibriums of three scenarios. Also, with the analysis and comparison, the suggestions are proposed for the government and enterprise, which can optimize the efficiency of closed-loop supply chain.
Model description and assumptions
This paper considers the closed-loop supply chain consisting of one-single manufacturer and one-single retailer under the condition of government subsidy, the framework is shown in Figure 1 .
For simplicity, we utilize the superscript "n" and "r" to denote the new and remanufactured products, as well as the subscript "n" and "r" to denote the primary and replacement consumers. Thus, consumers have the different preferences to the new and remanufactured products. In this structure, the recycler collects the obsolete products from the replacement consumers with the recycling price b and processes them to the manufacturer with the trading price 0 p . Meanwhile, the manufacturer produces the new and remanufactured products with the selling pricing n p , r p .
To establish the decision model of government and closed-loop supply chain, we consider the following assumptions to simplify research and highlight purpose as follows: 
. . 0 s t s  (6) Assumption 5. While the government, manufacturer and retailer are respectively optimizing their own goals, they have access to the asymmetry information and the decisions are considered in a single period. To establish Stackelberg game among government and supply chain members, we assume the government has sufficient power over manufacturer and retailer as the leader, with the similar assumption used by Savaskan et al. (2004) [20] the manufacturer uses its foresight about the recycler's reaction before making the optimal selling decisions.
Benchmark model: the government doesn't subsidy to CLSC
In this section, the manufacturer produces new and remanufactured products to the primary and replacement consumers, as well as is responsible for the collection of obsolete product. Before analyzing the game between the manufacturer and retailer in closed-loop supply chain, we discuss the new and remanufactured demands for primary and replacement consumers through comparing the value utilities to decide which product to buy. According to the above assumptions, we obtain as follows: 
Proposition 1. In Scenario N, the optimal decisions for the manufacturer and retailer can be summarized as follows:
Proof. We solve the Stackelberg game with the backward induction to guarantee the optimal decisions. According to the second order partial derivative of retailer's profit 
From the concavity of the Hessian matrix, the profit function of manufacturer In this scenario, we derive that the optimal decisions for manufacturer and retailer from the According to Corollary 1., the selling and recycling price mainly depend on the production cost, the trading price of obsolete product and the ratios of the primary consumer. The selling price and recycling price decrease with a rise in the trading price of obsolete product, and increase with a rise in the ratios of the primary consumer. Hence, it is necessary for enterprises to adopt the low price strategy for capturing the market demand of new and remanufactured product.
Additionally, when the ratio of primary consumer is low, the recycling quantity from replacement consumer is not very many and the consumers are willing to keep using the old product. Thus, it is necessary for the government to determine an appropriate subsidy to develop the recycling economic. Meanwhile, the first-order partial derivative of the remanufactured demands for primary and replacement consumer with respect to the difference of production cost and remanufactured preference give as
According to Corollary 2., the new demand for primary and replacement consumer decreases with the difference of production cost and remanufactured preference, the remanufactured demand increases with the difference of production cost and remanufactured preference. It means that the output of new product will replace that of remanufactured product with the rising production cost of remanufactured product. However, with the rising remanufactured preference, the output of new product will increase while that of remanufactured product drops. This they do to maintain the maximization of their profits based on the production and consumer preference. Meanwhile, the government should increase the enthusiasm of manufacturer and recycler to develop recycling economic through the subsidy policies.
Government subsidy mechanisms to CLSC
From the perspective of government, promoting circular economy is an inevitable choice for the sustainable development. In this section, the paper analyzes two kinds of subsidy mechanism through the manufacturer and recycler based on benchmark model, which to establish three-period game theoretic closed-loop supply chain model among the government, manufacturer and recycler to obtain the optimal equilibrium, as well as discuss the impacts of subsidy policy on the decisions and profits of supply chain. According to Stackelberg game, the model ensures perfect subgame equilibrium obtained from sequential games as follows: in first stage, the government determines the optimal subsidy decision based on the maximization of social welfare. During the second stage, the manufacturer decides the selling prices for new and remanufactured product given the best response of government. At the third stage, the recycler determines the recycling price of obsolete products from replacement consumers.
Model M: The government provides a subsidy to the manufacturer
How to incentive the enthusiasm of manufacturer to participate in the collection activity is an effective method to improve the efficiency of closed-loop supply chain. For example, China has Proposition 2. In Model M, the optimal decisions for the government subsidy is summarized as follows
Proof. As the above proof, the best response functions of the manufacturer and recycler are () 
According to the second order partial derivative of the social welfare with respect to the manufacturer subsidy m s , we get 22 
Model R: The government provides a subsidy to the recycler
Because of an important role in the closed-loop supply chain, the retailer is responsible for marketing activities of the new and remanufactured products. Therefore, the government expands the demand of remanufactured product through subsidy to stimulating the retailer's participation.
According to the law in developed countries like Japan and EU, original retailers should reprocess to deal with the steel and other metal in waste batteries, as well as get subsidy from government to ensure obtain profit through selling (Mitra et al., 2008 [21] and Jia et al., 2017 [35] ). Therefore, under this scenario of subsidizing retailer, the profit functions of manufacturer and retailer can be presented as follows
Then, we substitute the best response into the social welfare, we can obtain
From the above comparison, we can find the benefit of government subsidy is obvious. In the model M, the selling price of new product remains unchanged, that of remanufactured decreased and the recycling price of obsolete product increased. The impact on selling price and recycling price is direct that the manufacturer can improve the market demand through low-price strategy and save the production cost of remanufactured product, as well as the recycler can improve the profit margin. However, the behavior in collecting obsolete product from replacement consumers, the benefit for closed-loop supply chain is highest when the government subsidizes to the recycler.
Meanwhile, there is a direct effect on the selling prices of new and remanufactured product that the manufacturer sets a high price to offset the trading cost of remanufactured product. Hence, the implications of Corollary 3., we form an interesting result of our paper that the closer the agent to be subsidized in the market, the lower selling price and recycling price is in the different models.
Numerical analysis
In this section, we provide some numerical examples to illustrate the impacts of consumer proposition and remanufactured preference on the optimal pricing decision for closed-loop supply chain and varying government subsidies, as well as present the profit of manufacturer and recycler.
Based on the above analysis, we can compare the pricing, demand and profit under the different models. Following assumptions for relevant literature (Shu et al., 2017 [17] and Ray et al., 2005 16 [36]), the values of parameter in this papers can be adopted as follows:
The optimal decisions, demand and profits in different models According to the above results in Table 1 ., we obtain and compare the optimal solutions in different models. Model N are respectively the lowest and highest, as well as the price when the government subsidize to the manufacturer is somewhere in between. As for the social welfare in each model, it is clear that the government subsidy improves the values of profit and consumer surplus.
Comparing the different models, it is obvious that the values of supply chain profit, consumer surplus and social welfare while the government subsidizes to between the manufacturer and recycler are higher than those of Model N. Moreover, the subsidy to manufacturer will transfer to the consumer surplus and to recycler will transfer to the enterprise's profit. Therefore, the government should implement different subsidy policies based on the needs for economic and social progress.
The impact of relevant parameters on optimal decisions and social welfare
By the above calculation, the impacts of remanufactured preference and primary consumers' ratio on optimal pricing and social welfare in different models can be shown as in Figure 2 -5.
As seen in Figure 2 , we find that the selling price and collecting price in three cases increases with the ratio of primary consumers increases, which is an inversely proportional relationship between the ratios of new and primary consumers. In other words, the supply chain members in the strength of collecting and remanufacturing is weak, the collection price is smaller, ultimately reducing the cost of remanufacturing and the selling price of remanufactured products. Based on the competition between new product and remanufactured product, the selling price of new product also decreases. Compared different subsidy models, when the government subsidize to manufacturer are more likely to lower the selling price and collecting price. This is because the manufacturer is the most suitable operator to conduct market information, as well as is the closest to market and to consumers.
As shown in Figure 3 , the consumer surplus in the three cases increases with the ratio of primary consumers, as well as the consumer surplus the government subsidizes to manufacturer is the largest; the non-subsidy situation is the minimum. The profit of supply chain in the cases of non-subsidy and manufacture subsidy increases with the ratio of primary consumers increase, but that of recycler subsidy has a negative correlation. And only when a larger ratio of primary consumers, the supply chain profit in the case of manufacturer subsidy is the maximum; otherwise, that of recycler subsidy is the maximum. In addition, the trend of social welfare is consistent with that of supply chain profit
We obtain from Figure 4 , the selling prices of new product is unrelated to the remanufactured preference, as well as the selling price and collecting price are the same in the Model N and Model M, when the government subsidizes to recycler is the maximum. Meanwhile, the remanufactured preference has a positive relationship with the selling price of remanufactured product, has a negative relationship with the collecting price, as well as that in the Model M is the minimum, when the government subsidizes to recycler is the maximum. This is because when the consumer preference for remanufactured products increases, the acceptance of remanufactured product in the market is gradually increasing, the remanufactured product has more competitive advantage in the market competition
We can see from Figure 5 , when the remanufactured preference is relative small, the supply chain profit and social welfare decline with consumer preference increases. Furthermore, the social welfare and supply chain profit reach to be maximum when the government subsidies.
However, the remanufactured preference is relative large, supply chain profit and social welfare increase is maximum when consumer preference increases, when the government subsidies to the recycler. And only when the remanufacturing preferences are within a certain range, the consumer surplus in the different models is meaningful, and increase first and then decrease.
7.3
The impact of relevant parameters on optimal subsidy 18 By the above calculation, the impacts of remanufactured preference and primary consumers' ratio on optimal government subsidy in different models can be shown as in Figure 6 -7.
It can be seen from Figure 6 that with rising remanufactured preference, the optimal subsidy in Model M and Model R increase gradually. Additionally, the figure also shows the government should invest more when subsidizes to recycler than that of scenario subsidizes to manufacturer.
The main reason is the government subsidy to closed-loop supply chain comes from other industry, actually equivalent to the social welfare and social recourse reassign. Therefore, we can find the subsidy to manufacturer gives countermeasure of stimulating social demand, as well as to recycler accelerate the pace of development in remanufacturing. Further, Figure 7 shows that as the ratio of primary consumers, the optimal subsidy declines gradually when government subsidizes to the manufacturer. However, in the case with the ratio of primary consumers, the optimal government subsidy to the recycler has a gradual growth and then falling. It suggests that the government should provide subsidy to promote the collecting and remanufacturing behavior gaining support from between manufacturing and recycler easily in Model M when the ratio of primary consumers is not very obvious. Meanwhile, the subsidy to recycler becomes lower and lower as the market of replacement consumer is already shrinking in size. From the perspective of government, in order to promote enterprises to develop collecting and remanufacturing, the government has formulated a series of subsidy policies based on the market ratio between primary and replacement consumer.
Conclusions
We investigate an remanufacturing-preference product supply chain in a closed-loop setting,
where the new products are produced by a manufacturer and the remanufactured products are collected by a recycler then resells to manufacturer. We consider two segments of consumers: the primary consumers who can purchase new products or remanufactured products, the replacement consumers who trade in obsolete products for new products or remanufactured product. This paper aims to compare the impacts of government's policies with non-subsidy, manufacturer-subsidy and recycler-subsidy on the supply chain profit, consumer surplus and social welfare. According to comparison, we find that: 1) It is obvious that the values of supply chain profit, consumer surplus and social welfare while the government subsidizes to between the manufacturer and recycler are higher than those of Model N. Moreover, the subsidy to manufacturer will transfer to consumer surplus and to recycler will transfer to enterprise's profit; 2) Comparing different subsidy models, the government subsidize to manufacturer are more likely to get the selling price and collecting price lower.. This is because the manufacturer is the most suitable operator to conduct market information, as well as is the closest to market and to consumers; 3) The government subsidy improve the social welfare, as well as the government implement different subsidy policies based on the needs for economic and social progress. From the perspective of government, in order to promote to develop the collecting and remanufacturing, the government has formulated a series of subsidy policies based on the market ratio between primary and replacement consumer.
This paper has assumed that the trading price of obsolete products is fixed and an exogenous parameter. Our models can be extended in several directions such as introducing the competition of manufacturer and recycler. Besides, the differentiated recovery quality of obsolete products can be studied. Further, while we have focused on the horizontal and vertical cooperation between the manufacturer and recycler. 
